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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite theoretical developments in recent years, our understanding of corporate capital structure remains incomplete. Prior 
empirical research has been dominated by archival regression studies which are limited in their ability to fully reflect the 
diversity found in practice. The present paper reports on a comprehensive survey of corporate financing decision-making in 
192 UK listed companies. 
 
A key finding is that firms are heterogeneous in their capital structure policies. About half of the firms seek to maintain a 
target debt level, consistent with trade-off theory, but 60% claim to follow a financing hierarchy, consistent with pecking 
order theory. These two theories are not viewed by respondents as either mutually exclusive or exhaustive, since some firms 
adopt (at least partially) both strategies, while a significant number of firms do not appear to follow either of these strategies. 
Such observations raise concerns about the usefulness of large-scale regression modelling of capital structure determinants. 
In normal usage, these models can only describe whether a particular theory is consistent with the observed capital structure 
of the ‘average firm’ in the population. They are not typically used to model the diversity of capital structure practice.  
 
As found in many regression-based determinant studies, there is clear evidence here that company size affects corporate 
financing decisions. For example, large companies are more likely to adopt a target debt level and to maintain financial slack 
(though not more likely to follow a hierarchy of finance). Similarly, current high levels of gearing encourage a greater focus 
on particular issues such as projected cash flows, loan covenants and non-interest tax shields. This contingency on debt 
levels suggests that empirical studies of capital structure dynamics may be particularly fruitful. 
 
Investigation of debt level determinants shows that many of the theoretical arguments are widely accepted by respondents, in 
particular the importance of interest tax shield, financial distress, agency costs and also, at least implicitly, information 
asymmetry. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the seminal publication of Modigliani and Miller (1958), corporate finance researchers have 
devoted considerable effort to investigating capital structure decisions (e.g. Myers, 1977, 1984). 
Significant progress has been made in understanding the determinants of corporate capital structure 
with an increased emphasis on financial contracting theory (see, for example, Barclay and Smith, 
1995; Mehran et al., 1999; Graham et al., 1998 and, for an international view, Rajan and Zingales, 
1995). This theory suggests that firm characteristics such as business risk and investment opportunity 
set affect contracting costs. In turn, these costs impact on the choice between alternative forms of 
finance such as debt and equity, and between different classes of fixed-claim finance such as debt and 
leasing. Recent studies have begun to focus on dynamic aspects of capital structure (Ozkan, 2001; 
Antoniou et al., 2002; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Welch, 2004; Leary and Roberts, 2003; Flannery and 
Rangan, 2003). However, our understanding remains incomplete and this has prompted a large 
number of recent studies in the area of capital structure. 
 
The approach adopted in most studies seeks to explain observed capital structures in terms of factors 
felt likely to be important, usually using large-scale cross-sectional (and time series) regression 
methods. This approach involves identification of the broad consensus (average) behaviour of firms. It 
cannot capture the diversity in behaviour that can arise from firms adopting different capital structure 
policies, and which would lead to different functional forms in the regression models. Further, even in 
dynamic time series studies, only indirect inferences can be made about the financing decision-
making process as only the outcome of the process is studied. Writers in the area are beginning to 
argue that it is necessary to augment the dominant archival method by the use of different empirical 
approaches that offer greater insight into the behavioural aspects of the decision process (Tufano, 
2001).1  Survey methods and clinical methods are both candidates in this regard. 
 
The main aim of the present paper is to report on a comprehensive survey of the corporate financing 
decision-making process in UK companies to, inter alia, enable a comparison between practice and 
extant theories of capital structure. This requires knowledge of the measures that managers use, the 
factors that affect the choices made, and the theories that are being applied (either explicitly or 
implicitly, partially or completely) as well as knowledge of those factors and theories that they 
apparently disregard. Thus, the objective is to understand how companies determine their overall 
financing strategy, why they choose a particular mix of financing instruments, and why they choose to 
limit borrowings or set up spare borrowing capacity. The method explicitly allows a description of the 
diversity of capital structure practice. This then opens up the possibility for future research to 
investigate the specific factors or characteristics that encourage firms to choose different financing 
policies. 
 
One of the key findings of the study is that firms are heterogeneous in their capital structure policies. 
About half of the firms seek to maintain a target debt level, consistent with trade-off theory. However, 
60% of responding firms argued that they follow a financing hierarchy, consistent with pecking order 
theory. These two theories were not viewed by respondents as either mutually exclusive or 
exhaustive. Such observations raise doubts about the usefulness of adopting large-scale archival 
methods to investigate capital structure determinants since they cannot, in standard form, describe 
such diversity. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two provides a review of relevant 
theoretical and empirical literature and section three outlines the sample and data collection 
procedures employed. The results are presented in section four, followed by a summary and 
discussion in section five and a conclusion. 
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2. LITERATURE 
 
The capital structure literature is extensive and only a brief selective summary is provided below. For 
a more comprehensive treatment see the major review by Harris and Raviv (1991). 
 
(i) Capital structure: theory 
 
A basic model of capital structure determination has derived from the with-taxes Modigliani and 
Miller (1958, 1963) model with expansion to incorporate the financial distress costs of debt. This 
traditional static trade-off theory can be characterised by the assumption that capital structure is 
optimised with management weighing up the relative advantage of the tax-shield benefits of debt 
against the increased likelihood of incurring debt-related bankruptcy costs (Myers, 1984).  
 
However, in seeking to model the wide diversity of capital structure practice, a number of additional 
factors have been proposed in the literature. First, the use of debt finance can reduce agency costs 
between managers and shareholders by increasing the managers’ share of equity (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) and by reducing the ‘free’ cash available for managers’ personal benefits (Jensen, 
1986). It may also encourage managers to perform better in order to reduce the likelihood of 
bankruptcy, which is costly for managers (Grossman and Hart, 1982). Conflicts between debt-
providers and shareholders arise because the debt contract gives shareholders an incentive to invest 
sub-optimally in very risky projects. This implies an agency cost of using debt finance. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that an optimal capital structure can be obtained by trading off the agency 
costs of debt against the benefit of debt, in what might be termed an extended trade-off model. 
 
Second, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that, under asymmetric information, equity may be mispriced 
by the market. If firms finance new projects by issuing equity, underpricing may be so severe that new 
investors gain more of the project NPV to the detriment of existing shareholders. This may lead to an 
‘underinvestment’ problem since such projects will be rejected even if the NPV is positive. This 
underinvestment can be reduced by financing the project using a security that is less likely to be 
mispriced by the market. Internal funds involve no undervaluation and even debt that is not too risky 
will be preferred to equity. Myers (1984) refers to this as the pecking order theory of capital structure. 
The description follows earlier empirical work by Donaldson (1961), in which he observed that 
managers preferred to fund investment initially from retained profits rather than use outside funds. 
This preference led firms to adopt dividend policies that reflected their anticipated need for 
investment funds, policies which managers were reluctant to substantially change. If retained profits 
exceeded investment needs then debt would be repaid. If external finance was required, firms tended 
first to issue the safest security, debt, and only issued equity as a last resort.  
 
Under this model, there is no well-defined target mix of debt and equity finance. Each firm’s observed 
debt ratio reflects its cumulative requirements for external finance. Generally, profitable firms will 
borrow less because they can rely on internal funds. The preference for internal equity implies that 
firms will use less debt than suggested by the trade-off theory. Further, firms are more likely to create 
financial slack to finance future projects. 
 
Other factors that have been invoked to help explain the diversity of observed capital structures 
include: management behaviour (Williamson, 1988); corporate strategy (Barton and Gordon, 1988); 
firm-stakeholder interaction (Grinblatt and Titman, 1998, Ch. 16); and corporate control issues (Harris 
and Raviv, 1988, 1991).  
 
A significant strand of the empirical literature has sought to distinguish which of the two main 
theories best explains capital structure practice (e.g. Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Fama and 
French, 2002; Adedeji, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003). Implicit in such testing is that the theories have 
elements that are mutually exclusive. While the theories in their basic form do lead to a set of 
‘precisely opposite’ predictions (Barclay and Smith, 1999), there is increasing recognition that neither 
theory is able, independently, to explain the complexity encountered in practice. This is particularly 
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true when seeking a unified theory to explain the broader array of corporate financial policy choices 
(Barclay and Smith, 1999).  
 
(ii) Capital structure: empirical evidence 
 
In the main, two empirical approaches have been used to obtain evidence on factors that affect 
corporate financing decisions. The first approach, adopted in the majority of studies, seeks to explain 
observed capital structures in terms of factors felt likely to be important, usually using cross-sectional 
regression methods. Based on an informal meta-analysis of twenty papers across several countries, 
Thomson (2003) identifies several key features of firms that seem to be related to debt ratios across a 
wide range of environments and through time: size (+), earnings variability (+), asset tangibility (+), 
profitability (–), investment opportunity set (–) and industry. The evidence on tax influence is weak, 
perhaps reflecting the endogeneity between tax rates and financing choice (Graham et al., 1998). With 
a few exceptions, UK cross-sectional studies (Bennett and Donnelly, 1993; Lasfer, 1995; Adedeji, 
1998; Bevan and Danbolt, 1998) and panel regression studies (Ozkan, 2001; Antoniou et al., 2002; 
Bevan and Danbolt; 2004) generally find similar relationships to those found in the US and elsewhere. 
Two of the robust observations cause specific difficulties for theory: the negative relationship between 
debt ratio and profitability is consistent with the logic of pecking order theory but inconsistent with 
trade-off theory; the negative investment opportunity set observation supports trade-off theory but not 
pecking order theory.  
 
Other UK studies include an early one by Marsh (1982), who investigated security issues and found 
that companies are heavily influenced by market conditions and the past history of security prices in 
choosing between debt and equity. He also provided evidence that companies appear to make their 
choice of financing instruments as if they have target levels of debt in mind. These debt levels are 
themselves functions of company size, bankruptcy risk and asset composition. The related study by 
Walsh and Ryan (1997) found both agency and tax considerations were important in determining debt 
and equity issues. Lasfer (1999) investigated the determinants of debt structure, maturity and priority 
structures and found significant differences across company size; in particular, the relationship 
between debt and agency costs only applies to large companies whereas small company debt appears 
to be driven by profitability. Bevan and Danbolt (2002) focused on the difficulties in measuring 
gearing and found that debt determinants appear to vary significantly between short-term and long-
term components of debt. The pecking order theory prediction that there should be a negative 
relationship between the dividend payout ratio and investment was confirmed by Adedeji (1998). In a 
UK replication and extension of the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) test of pecking order against 
trade-off theory, Adedeji (2002) found mixed evidence, with neither theory dominant. Overall, the 
evidence for the UK (as for the US) is somewhat inconclusive. While various individual factors can 
be identified as important, neither of the two major theories is capable independently of adequately 
explaining the outcomes of firms’ financing decisions in practice.  
 
Recent studies have begun to focus on dynamic aspects of capital structure such as whether, as 
implied in the trade-off theory, firms engage in capital structure rebalancing. Ozkan (2001) provided 
evidence that UK firms do have target ratios and adjust to the target ratio relatively quickly. Antoniou 
et al. (2002) showed that firms in three European countries (including the UK) adjust their debt ratios 
to attain target structures, but at different speeds, suggesting that environmental and traditions are also 
important determinants. Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Welch (2004) suggested that US firms fail to 
rebalance in response to changes in leverage resulting from equity issues, or market changes in equity 
values, respectively. By contrast, Leary and Roberts (2003) argued that frictions in the capital markets 
encourage firms to adjust capital structure, but that this adjustment is relatively infrequent, leading to 
‘extended excursions away from their targets’ (Myers, 1984). They found that US firms behave as if 
they follow a dynamic trade-off policy in which they actively rebalance leverage to stay within an 
optimal range. Flannery and Rangan (2003) extended this idea by developing a model that allowed 
firms’ target capital structures to vary over time and for firms to adjust gradually towards the target. 
They confirmed that US firms operate with a target leverage ratio, and more than halve the distance to 
the target within two years. Finally, one of the major observations contrary to the trade-off theory, the 
strong inverse relationship between profitability and leverage has been shown to be reconcilable by 
consideration of mean reversion in earnings (Sarkar and Zapatero, 2003). While the evidence is far 
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from conclusive, on balance it seems that some form of target or target range is employed by firms, 
consistent with the logic of trade-off theory.  
 
However, using the large-scale regression approach invariably involves identification of the average 
behaviour of firms and does not measure its diversity. In particular, it does not allow for the 
possibility that some firms may choose to adopt a hierarchical ‘pecking-order view’ of finance while 
others, perhaps the majority, adopt a target capital structure.2 Further, its focus on the outcomes of the 
financing decision-making process necessarily limits our understanding of the process itself.  An 
alternative approach is to ask company managers directly about their attitudes and behaviour 
regarding corporate financing using the survey method. This allows both the process and diversity of 
practice to be investigated, offering a richer understanding of practice. 
 
Prior surveys of general capital structure issues have been mainly US-based (e.g. Donaldson, 1961; 
Scott and Johnson, 1982; Pinegar and Wilbricht, 1989; Norton, 1989; Graham and Harvey, 2001). To 
the best of our knowledge, there exists only one published study on Australia (Allen, 1991) and one 
on the UK (Fawthrop and Terry, 1975) as well as two cross-country comparisons (Stonehill et al., 
1975; Allen, 1999).3 Table 1 provides a brief summary of the survey studies. 
 
< TABLE 1 about here > 
 
In the only UK study, Fawthrop and Terry’s (1975) primary focus was on the use of leasing finance 
but they also included a small number of questions concerning attitudes to debt. Almost all 
respondents acknowledged that they would use debt to finance capital expenditure but that there was a 
limit to the amount of debt a company ought to use. This limit was likely to be set in relation to the 
debt to equity ratio or ‘prior charges cover’. The size of this limit was not explicitly explored in the 
survey but a gearing limit of 40% was ‘often’ mentioned, without justification, in interview 
discussions. Unfortunately, the relatively early stage of theory development and the many 
environmental changes since 1974 severely limit the relevance of the results for current use. 
 
More recently, Graham and Harvey (2001) conducted a major survey in the US of views about the 
cost of capital, capital budgeting and capital structure. The responses relating to capital structure 
suggest that firms are concerned about financial flexibility and credit ratings when issuing debt, and 
earnings per share dilution and recent stock price appreciation when issuing equity. They found some 
evidence to support both the pecking order theory and trade-off theory but little evidence that 
executives are concerned about asset substitution, asymmetric information, transaction costs, free cash 
flows, or personal taxes. 
 
Survey-based analysis complements both the more common research method based on large sample 
regressions and intensive small-sample case studies. The use of multiple methods facilitates the 
triangulation of results.4 Our choice of survey approach in the current study reflects a desire to 
investigate the diversity of financial structure practice and aspects of the financing decision-making 
process itself rather than just the outcome of the process. 
 
3. METHODS 
 
(i) Sample selection 
 
The sample of finance directors was based on the population of industrial and commercial UK listed 
companies contained in the UKQI list on Datastream in March 2000. The questionnaire was sent in 
July 2000 to a systematic sample of two-thirds (831) of this population. Non-response is a significant, 
and increasing, problem in the survey method and so a relatively large initial sample was used to 
provide a satisfactory absolute number of responses to support meaningful statistical analysis. 
 
(ii) Questionnaire design and administration procedures 
 
The questionnaire content was based upon a review of the theoretical and empirical literature in the 
area, including previous surveys. This was used to produce a draft questionnaire that was piloted on 
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two finance directors (out of ten companies randomly selected from the non-sample balance of the 
population); a technical representative of the Association of Corporate Treasurers; and two professors 
of finance. The questionnaire content and terminology was revised accordingly. 
 
The full questionnaire covering capital structure and leasing decisions was 16 pages long (including 
covers). It was accompanied by an explanatory covering letter that assured the confidentiality of 
responses. Each questionnaire was numbered to facilitate follow-up procedures and to enable the 
characteristics of responding companies to be identified. The contents page included general 
instructions for completion together with definitions of various key terms used in the questionnaire 
(capital structure, debt finance, equity finance and target capital structure). Seven pages were devoted 
to capital structure issues and asked for responses to a potential total of 98 question elements.5 Section 
A included questions relating to the determinants of the responding company’s capital structure. 
Section B sought views on general statements regarding the determinants of capital structure. The 
final section asked for brief information about the respondent. The questionnaire used various 
question forms including those requiring yes/no answers, numerical estimates, ranking of alternatives, 
closed-form questions adopting a five-point Likert scale with verbal anchors and a small number of 
open-ended questions. 
 
Many of the standard response-enhancing techniques were adopted including: designing a clear 
questionnaire layout; piloting; defining key terms at the start of the questionnaire; addressing the 
covering letter to a specific named individual (all finance director details and addresses were 
individually checked by telephone); covering letters signed individually by researchers; follow-up 
letters approximately 10 and 20 days after the initial request; stamped reply envelopes (rather than 
reply-paid envelopes); requesting non-respondents to return the questionnaire (Bourque and Fielder, 
1995; Mangione, 1995). 
 
(iii) Further analysis procedures 
 
The extent to which respondents’ opinions were related to company size, gearing level and industry 
group was also investigated.6 Several arguments link company size to capital structure decisions. 
First, large firms are typically more diversified and, therefore, less likely to suffer financial distress. 
Second, small firms are often restricted from using long-term debt and equity because of large fixed 
issuing costs, and tend to finance by short-term bank loans (Marsh, 1982). Third, small firms may be 
subject to greater agency costs because they are more flexible and better able to increase the risk of 
investment projects. Thus, lenders may be less willing to provide debt finance to small firms 
(Grinblatt and Titman, 1998). 
 
These arguments suggest that, in general, large firms: 
• have less concern than small firms about financial distress and agency costs of using debt; 
• enjoy greater potential benefits from the debt tax shield, partly because distress/agency costs 
are lower and more directly because large firms are less likely to benefit from the ‘small 
company’ corporation tax rate of 20%;7 
• have less concentrated managerial ownership suggesting: 
• higher agency costs resulting from shareholder-manager conflict 
• lower concern about corporate control issues than small firm owner-managers; 
• have greater influence over their capital structure than small firms, as a result of transaction 
costs for market-based finance; thus, policies of maintaining a target debt level, or following a 
hierarchy, may be more sustainable for large firms; and 
• have greater ability to maintain financial slack, given lenders reluctance to provide debt 
finance to small firms. 
 
Respondents were classified into three equal-sized sub-samples of small, medium and large 
companies based on total assets, with comparisons being made between the responses from the large 
and small sub-samples. 
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A firm’s current level of gearing may influence a respondent’s perception of the factors that are 
important in determining debt levels. For example, high geared firms might consider the interest tax 
shield benefit to debt and financial distress costs to be of great significance. Similarly, cash 
flows/income flows and restrictive covenants might be of greater concern. High gearing might 
encourage firms to seek to control debt by setting targets. They might have less opportunity to 
maintain financial slack if they are already functioning at or near their debt capacity. However, since 
firms with low debt capacity may also find financial slack hard to maintain, the relationship between 
gearing and financial slack is difficult to predict. The ratio of total debt to the market value of equity 
was used to identify equal-sized sub-samples of high, medium and low geared companies and enable 
comparisons of responses between high and low geared companies. 
 
Prior research has identified a firm’s industry as a potentially important determinant of capital 
structure. Firms characterised by high operating risk are more susceptible to financial distress. Those 
in cyclical sectors will suffer greater variability in profitability, while some, such as information 
technology firms, are subject to technological risks and typically employ firm-specific intangible 
assets. Further, high growth sectors may experience high agency costs through restrictions imposed by 
lenders to reduce the greater opportunities for asset substitution. Maintenance of financial slack might 
be preferred by firms in high growth sectors with ample investment opportunities. Also, different 
product market or competitive environments across industries may also affect capital structure 
decisions. Respondents were classified into nine broad industrial groupings based on Stock Exchange 
sectors (basic industries, cyclical consumer goods, cyclical services, information technology, general 
industries, non-cyclical consumer goods, non-cyclical services, resources and utilities). 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
After describing the response profile, this section covers six key areas: debt ratios; target capital 
structure; hierarchy in capital structure; maintenance of spare borrowing capacity; determinants of 
capital structure, and further analysis of size, gearing and industry effects. 
 
(i) Response profile 
 
From the mailing to 831 finance directors, 192 usable responses were received representing a 
response rate of 23%.8 Six additional responses were received from those who requested a copy of the 
questionnaire when replying to a questionnaire on a related topic,9 giving a total of 198 usable 
responses. Prior research studies involving similar subjects have obtained response rates of between 
9% and 35%. The response rate in the present study is in line with recent studies and, given the length 
of the questionnaire, can be considered good. 
 
Three tests for response bias were performed. First, responding companies were compared with the 
population of UKQI companies on the basis of size (measured as total assets). A 2-tail t-test 
confirmed no difference between the sample mean total assets and the population mean at the 10% 
significance level.10 Second, the respondent companies were formed into nine broad industrial 
categories based on Stock Exchange sectors and a χ2 goodness-of-fit test confirmed that the sample 
companies were distributed similarly to companies in the UKQI population (χ2 = 9.39; p= 0.310). 
 
Finally, the responses of early responders were compared to those of late responders on the 
assumption that late responders are similar to non-responders (Oppenheim, 1966). As there were no 
particularly ‘key’ questions in the questionnaire on which to focus, a series of tests appropriate to the 
question form (i.e. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney, t-test, χ2) was conducted for the 64 closed-form 
question elements. As only three significant differences (at the 5% level) emerged, the sample of 
respondent finance directors is likely to be representative of the population of UKQI companies and 
so non-response is unlikely to be a major issue in interpreting the results of the survey.11
 
A further factor that can affect the validity of responses is the suitability of individual respondents, in 
terms of knowledge about the issues under investigation. All of those who confirmed their corporate 
position in the final section of the questionnaire were senior financial personnel likely to be 
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knowledgeable about capital structure issues: finance directors (63%), treasurers (13%), financial 
controller (8%) or similar senior personnel (16%). 
 
An important contextual element in understanding respondents’ views concerns their perceptions of 
stock market efficiency. This was assessed by asking respondents to indicate the percentage of time 
that their ordinary shares are fairly priced by the market. Answers suggested that most respondents do 
not accept the notion of market efficiency. For example, 86% felt that the market fairly priced their 
shares less than three-quarters of the time,12 suggesting that managers generally do not believe the 
market to be efficient.  This compares with approximately 52% in the earlier US study by Pinegar and 
Wilbricht (1989), reflecting either a decline in the acceptance of market efficiency or perhaps national 
differences in its acceptance. 
 
(ii) Debt levels 
 
In response to the question ‘Does your company believe that there is a maximum amount of debt 
financing that should not be surpassed?’, 69% of respondents responded affirmatively. Thus, while 
the majority of companies believe that the debt level has to be constrained, a significant minority 
(31%) do not believe this is necessary. Of those companies that believe debt should be limited, most 
(91%) indicated that their maximum debt level is defined by reference to a limit placed on balance 
sheet and/or income statement gearing measures. 
 
In a separate question, 75% of respondents confirmed that they measured financial gearing.13 Of the 
five different measures offered, interest cover and the net debt to equity ratio were clearly favoured. 
These had mean scores of 4.1 and 4.0 (on a scale from 1 (not used) to 5 (very important)), and were 
identified as ‘important’ or ‘very important’ by 80% and 75% of the companies that measured 
gearing, respectively. Of the respondents who measure gearing and are also engaged in leasing, 
approximately 75% claimed to recognise fixed finance and operating lease payments in calculating 
financial gearing measures. This could be taken to imply that a significant proportion of companies 
use a version of the ‘fixed charge cover’ measure; however, such a measure was not proposed as an 
alternative in the open-ended option for gearing measures. The majority of respondents that measure 
debt to equity ratios use book values (83%) rather than theoretically-supported market values (12%); 
5% use both measures. Scott and Johnson (1982) found that 92% of their US respondents used book 
values rather than market values, suggesting that the practice may be pervasive. This observation is 
entirely consistent with our finding (section 4(i) above) that managers’ do not generally believe the 
stock market to be efficient. Why would a manager adopt a policy-relevant measure that is based on 
share price, which is not within his control, is highly volatile and which he believes to be incorrect 
much of the time? Indeed, the use of book values may also have some theoretical justification since 
these are related to the value of assets in place rather than the value of intangibles and growth 
opportunities (Myers, 1984). Importantly, managers’ use of book values also helps to explain why 
research using market value measures of equity finds that firms do not seem to adjust their capital 
structure to changes in equity values (Welch, 2004).  
 
(iii) Target capital structure 
 
In the trade-off theory of capital structure, companies are said to operate with a target debt/equity ratio 
at which the costs and benefits of issuing debt are balanced. Table 2 (Panels A to C) summarises the 
responses to a group of questions that focussed specifically on this theory. Panel A shows that 
approximately half of the companies (51%) indicated that they did maintain a target capital structure. 
Of these, 73% claimed it to be ‘flexible’ and 27% ‘reasonably strict’. Panel B shows that targets 
ranged from 0% to 300% with a mean (median) of 45% (40%) and with 80% of companies indicating 
a target of 50% or less debt. Fawthrop and Terry (1975) reported a similar group norm limit of debt 
financing of 40% in the very different economic environment over 25 years ago. 
 
< TABLE 2 about here > 
 
Even for companies with target debt levels, fluctuations in actual debt levels may be observed over 
time. This may be because the targets themselves are flexible, or because transaction costs lead to 
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‘lumpy’ changes in debt or equity levels, or because the actual, or perceived, costs and benefits 
associated with the use of debt change over time. Two-thirds (67%) of companies with target debt 
levels formally reviewed their target on a regular basis. Companies that did not review the targets 
regularly were asked, in an open-ended question, to specify what would trigger a review. The two 
most frequently quoted responses were that there was a continuous review of the capital structure 
target, or that reviews coincided with substantial acquisition, merger and investment activities. 
 
Finally, to assess the main ‘drivers’ of capital structure targets, respondents were asked to rank nine 
potential influences in setting target capital structure ratios. Panel C of Table 2 suggests that the main 
force in setting target capital structure seems to come from within the company: company senior 
management were ranked the most important, significantly ahead of other potential influences. Thus, 
capital structure seems to be internally rather than externally constrained. 
 
(iv) Hierarchy in capital structure 
 
In the pecking order theory of capital structure, companies are said to relate profit and growth 
opportunities to their long-term target dividend pay-out ratios in order to minimise the need for 
external funds. Investment opportunities and dividend pay-out, therefore, dictate the amount of 
external financing. The flexibility of the financing decision in relation to investment and dividend 
decisions was investigated by asking respondents: ‘Given an attractive new growth opportunity that 
could not be taken without departing from your existing capital structure, cutting dividend or selling 
off other assets, what action is your company most likely to take?’. 86% said that the company would 
deviate from existing capital structure, 15% would sell off other assets, 5% would forgo the growth 
opportunity, just 2% would cut dividends with 2% answering ‘don’t know’.14 Companies with a target 
capital structure were less likely to deviate from their existing capital structure than companies that 
had no target (χ2 = 9.12; p = 0.003). 
 
The next question focused directly on the pecking order theory by asking ‘Does your company follow 
a hierarchy in which the most favoured sources of finance are exhausted before other sources?’. 60% 
answered affirmatively and were asked to rank eight listed sources of finance. Both finance and 
operating leases were included in order to determine, for the first time, how leasing ranks in relation 
to other sources of finance. A summary of the rankings is shown in Table 3. 
  
< TABLE 3 about here > 
 
Consistent with the pecking order theory, internal reserves were most favoured by respondents, 
followed by straight debt. There was a significant gap before the third-ranked group of finance 
sources (finance leases, operating leases and ordinary shares), with each of this third group subject to 
a high variation (standard deviation) in ranking. The similarity in mean rank between finance and 
operating leases is perhaps surprising given the predominant and prolific use of operating leases in 
recent years (Beattie at al., 1998). 
 
As stated above, some prior research appears to assume that the pecking order and trade-off theories 
are competing descriptors of company practice. Table 4 investigates this crucial assumption by 
providing a cross-tabulation between the two views. 60% of respondents claimed to follow a 
hierarchy and 50% a target capital structure. However, 32% claimed to follow both and 22% to follow 
neither. If the two theories are perceived as mutually exclusive by respondents, a negative association 
would be expected. This was not found, suggesting that companies do not make their capital structure 
decisions consistent with either of these theories exclusively. A broadly similar result was found in 
the US where 26% of ‘hierarchy’ companies also claimed to have a target debt ratio (compared with 
54% in the present study). Inter alia, this led Norton (1989) to conclude that ‘firms seem to use an 
eclectic approach when considering financing alternatives’.  
 
One possible explanation for these observations is that when a manager is faced with a financing 
decision at a particular point in time, he may be influenced to a greater or lesser extent by the 
reasoning underpinning both of the main theories. For example, imagine a manager with a belief that 
information asymmetry and transaction costs are so large for his firm that he adopts a fundamental 
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pecking order theory approach to financing. The firm has been a net investor in recent years, with a 
deficit of internal resources (retained profit), so has been increasing its borrowings to the high current 
level. At this point in time, the manager has to decide whether to raise more debt or issue equity, and 
the major consideration that is likely to affect the current decision will be the relative costs. For debt, 
these will be the direct after-tax interest cost, transaction costs, as well as potential agency costs and, 
given the high debt level, significant distress costs, all costs typically associated with trade-off theory. 
For equity, it will be the equity required rate of return, transaction costs, together with information 
asymmetry costs. Thus, while the primary approach for the firm is based on pecking order theory, the 
current decision may be driven mainly by trade-off theory considerations. Effectively, the firm has a 
maximum amount of debt that it believes is optimal and so at this stage in the financing cycle it does 
have a target. How would the manager reply to the questions about whether the firm follows a 
hierarchy and whether it has a target debt level? He might answer yes to both, or recognising that the 
specific decision had elements of both theories, he might answer no to both since he may not consider 
he is exclusively adopting one theory or the other. 
 
On the other hand, imagine a manager who typically seeks to minimise financing costs, by balancing 
the overall agency and distress costs of debt with the tax benefit (a trade-off theory manager). While 
operating with a target debt level, he may be quite happy to deviate from that level in the short-term, 
for example by using internal funds because of transaction costs (or even inertia). Thus he may be 
acting, in the short-term, within a hierarchy of financing sources. The first manager is long-term 
pecking-order, short-term trade-off and vice versa for the second manager. A similar line of argument, 
which he called ‘modified pecking order’, was tentatively put forward by Myers (1984) when seeking 
to reconcile theory and financing practice. Frank and Goyal (2003) provided an alternative description 
when concluding that the need for outside funds, rather than being the driving factor in capital 
structure decisions, was simply one factor among many that firms trade off. They suggested that the 
informational asymmetry aspects in the pecking order theory could most usefully be incorporated as 
an additional factor in a generalised version of the trade-off model.  
 
The observation here that neither of the main theories is dominant helps to explain the diversity of 
evidence from empirical research studies and suggests that future theoretical work might profitably 
consider ways of synthesising the key elements from both theories. To support these theoretical 
advances, empirical work, using intensive interview-based methods, could seek to understand the 
contingent nature of financing decisions (i.e., the circumstances in which each of the main approaches 
dominates). 
 
< TABLE 4 about here > 
 
(v) Maintenance of spare borrowing capacity 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that companies are likely to maintain spare borrowing capacity 
(financial slack) to avoid the need for external funds. Table 5 reports the responses to four questions 
investigating financial slack. Panel A shows that 59% of companies acknowledged a policy for 
maintaining spare borrowing capacity. For the respondents able to quantify the level, the estimated 
slack ranged between 0% and 100% of existing total long-term debt with a majority (64%) within the 
1-25% range; the mean was 29% (Panel B). Most of these companies used an overdraft facility as the 
source of slack with secured and unsecured loans, and leasing/hire purchase as other significant 
sources (Panel C). All of the four offered reasons why companies might maintain slack were accepted 
by a substantial proportion of respondents: unplanned opportunities; for acquisitions; as a reserve for 
crisis; and for special projects (Panel D). 
 
< TABLE 5 about here > 
 
Thus, there is some evidence consistent with the pecking order theory suggestion of the need for 
financial flexibility. However, flexibility is also important for reasons unrelated to the theory (Opler et 
al., 1999). Further, under the pecking order theory, companies adopt a hierarchy of financial sources 
and are likely to maintain financial slack. This expected positive association is not evident in a cross-
tabulation between responses to the two questions about hierarchy and slack (χ2 = 0.39; p = 0.534).  
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(vi) Determinants of capital structure 
 
The factors determining the choice of capital structure were explored in two questions, the first 
dealing specifically with the responding company’s decisions and the second relating more generally 
to decisions by listed UK companies. By framing the second question more generally, the potentially 
sensitive nature of a firm-specific question can be reduced. For example, a respondent might not 
recognise (and/or acknowledge) agency problems in his/her own firm but might accept that other 
firms suffer from agency problems. 
 
In the first question, respondents were asked the relative importance of thirteen factors in choosing an 
appropriate amount of total debt for their company. Panel A of Table 6 summarises mean responses in 
order of importance. The factors included two basic issues concerning the projected benefits from the 
assets financed (row 2) and the volatility of company earnings/cash flows (row 3). Several factors 
related to the traditional trade-off theory’s balance between the benefits and costs of using debt: 
interest tax shield benefits (row 7); the availability of non-debt tax shields (row 10); interest costs 
(row 6); bankruptcy costs (row 9 and, indirectly, row 1); and the personal tax costs of lenders (row 
13). Two agency cost factors were included: reducing free cash to control management (row 12); 
restrictive debt covenants (row 5). Two factors concerned corporate control issues: take-over target 
likelihood (row 11) and equity dilution (row 8). Finally, one factor focussed on customer/supplier 
attitudes (row 4), addressing the issue of firm-stakeholder interaction. 
 
< TABLE 6 about here > 
 
The most important factor in determining the appropriate debt level was ensuring long term 
survivability of the company. This suggests that avoidance of bankruptcy (or perhaps take-over) 
features highly in debt level decisions. However, somewhat inconsistently, the direct factor ‘potential 
costs of bankruptcy’ was only considered fairly important, but with high response variability. The 
factor with the second-highest mean response was the projected cash flow/earnings from the assets 
financed. There was a relatively high level of agreement on the two main factors as indicated by the 
low variability. 
  
A group of three factors (rows 3-5) rated third highest in importance. Two of these related indirectly 
to bankruptcy costs while the third was an agency cost of debt; close behind (row 6) was the level of 
interest rates. Three of these four features are consistent with the trade-off theory. Similarly, of the 
next set of four factors grouped around a mean score of 3 (‘fairly important’), three also support the 
trade-off theory (rows 7, 9 and 10). However, one (row 8), avoiding the issue of equity and associated 
equity dilution, is consistent with the pecking-order theory. 
 
Takeover prevention (row 11), disciplinary control of managers (row 12) and the personal tax cost of 
lenders (row 13) were not seen as particularly important, the latter suggesting that companies do not 
target a clientele of investors with certain tax characteristics. 
 
The second question concerning capital structure determinants asked respondents to indicate the 
extent of their agreement with 17 general statements in the context of UK listed companies’ financing 
decisions. Seven of the statements concerned the issue of asymmetric information (rows 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 
14 and 17), three considered agency costs (rows 4, 8 and 12) and two related to interest tax shield 
(rows 2 and 11). Statements also dealt directly with the trade-off theory (row 15), the pecking order 
theory (row 13), competitive strategy/agency costs (row 5), corporate control (row 16), and market 
frictions (row 10). A summary of respondents’ views, in descending order of agreement, is provided 
in Panel A of Table 7. 
 
< TABLE 7 about here > 
 
Respondents agreed most strongly that, in making debt and equity decisions, a company considers the 
market response to new issues of debt and equity (88% agreed). This suggests that respondents may 
be concerned, at least implicitly, about information asymmetry between management and investors, a 
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justification for the pecking order theory. In addition, one of the three other statements receiving a 
‘high’ level of agreement (> 60% agreed) relates to information asymmetry (row 3), while also 
reflecting managers’ general views that the market is not efficient in pricing equity (section 4(i) 
above). The other two relate to interest tax shield (row 2), and agency costs (row 4), consistent with 
the trade-off theory. 
 
Two further statements received ‘moderate’ agreement (> 40% agreed). One concerned competitive 
strategy/agency costs (row 5), and the other related to information asymmetry (row 6). 
 
Significant disagreement was recorded for seven statements. Respondents disagreed most strongly 
with the information asymmetry argument that issuing shares sends unfavourable signals concerning 
future long-term prospects (row 17; 75% disagreed). This response is not consistent with empirical 
evidence that share issues are associated with future return underperformance, on average (Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves, 1995; Loughran and Ritter, 1995). Finance directors may not know about the 
evidence, may not believe it, or may not want to believe it since it would constrain their potential 
future financing choices. Respondents also strongly rejected the ‘corporate control’ argument that a 
company would issue shares to dilute the holdings of certain shareholders (row 16). 
 
Of particular interest is the strong rejection of the fundamental logic of the trade-off theory, that the 
present value of interest tax shields is balanced with the present value of possible bankruptcy costs 
(row 15). However, given that this is inconsistent with other responses concerning elements of the 
theory (discussed above), one explanation might be that respondents were rejecting the notion of 
formal quantitative evaluation rather than the underlying logic. Nevertheless, the logic of the pecking 
order theory fares little better since respondents disagreed that a company issues debt when recent 
profits are not sufficient to fund activities (row 13). They also disagreed that share price usually 
declines when debt is issued (row 14) and, perhaps surprisingly, that the decision to issue debt or 
equity is affected by the existence of tax loss carry forwards (row 11). 
 
Respondents acknowledged the adverse consequences of bankruptcy from a personal perspective by 
rejecting the notion that, if bankruptcy occurred, finance directors would find comparable positions of 
employment elsewhere (row 12). This lends support to the Grossman and Hart (1982) argument that 
issuing debt may encourage directors to perform better in order to reduce the likelihood of 
bankruptcy. 
 
(vii) Size, gearing and industry effects 
 
The extent to which opinions on capital structure decisions are related to company size, gearing level 
and industry group factors was investigated. 
 
Size effects 
 
The likelihood of adopting a target capital structure was found to be associated with company size 
(Table 2, Panel A: χ2 = 8.51; p = 0.014). Further partitioning analysis (p. 194, Siegel and Castellan, 
1988) confirmed that large companies were more likely to have a target capital structure, and that 
small companies were more likely to have no target. This is consistent with the argument that large 
companies have greater control over their capital structure than small companies and may reflect large 
companies’ greater access to finance, their response to stock market pressures or deliberate internal 
policy choice. By contrast, the preference for a hierarchy of sources of finance was independent of 
company size (χ2 = 2.17; p = 0.339). However, large companies (71%) were more likely to maintain 
financial slack than medium (66%) or small (41%); the association between size and financial slack 
was highly significant (χ2 = 13.82; p = 0.001). This probably reflects the inability of small companies 
to create financial slack, but is also consistent with larger companies maintaining financial flexibility 
to reduce the need to raise external funds. 
 
Table 6 (Panel B, column 1) shows that large companies are more positive than small companies in 
their response concerning three determinants of their own total debt level: the tax advantages of 
interest deductions; avoiding the need to issue dilutive equity; and preventing the company from 
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becoming a take-over target. The first indicates a greater concern for taxation issues that may reflect 
higher profitability in larger companies, lower agency costs or perhaps the higher tax rate that they 
often suffer. The second is somewhat surprising since small companies are likely to include more 
owner-managers than large. It possibly reflects the fact that small companies find it more difficult to 
access ‘new equity’ markets, so the prospect of an equity issue is not in the mind-set of managers. The 
third might reflect a greater awareness in large companies of the opportunities for using debt to reduce 
the likelihood of takeover or perhaps that takeovers, as potentially attractive exit strategies, are viewed 
positively by some small firm owner-managers. 
 
Only one significant company size-based difference was observed in Table 7 (Panel B, column 1). 
Large firms more strongly disagreed with the suggestion that share price usually declines when debt is 
issued, perhaps reflecting their greater experience of major debt issues. 
 
Gearing effects 
 
From the responses obtained, there is some evidence that high geared companies are more likely to 
adopt a target capital structure, and weaker evidence that they are more likely to follow a hierarchy of 
finance and to maintain financial slack than low geared companies. The statistical significance of the 
associations is sensitive to the particular definitions of gearing and to the test applied. The cause and 
effect relationship here is unclear. The evidence might suggest that companies that find themselves in 
a situation of high gearing focus more closely on controlling, or justifying, the high debt levels. 
Alternatively, companies that more deliberately adopt a particular capital structure strategy might be 
able to accommodate (or justify) higher gearing levels. Unfortunately, it is also possible that gearing 
is proxying for size here. Although absolute levels of company size and gearing are not significantly 
correlated, the three size categories are significantly positively associated with the three gearing 
categories. 
 
Table 6 (Panel B, column 2) indicates that more highly geared companies are particularly concerned 
about projected cash flows, presumably whether they will cover interest charges. Not surprisingly, 
they are also more focussed on debt covenants than companies with low gearing. The relative 
importance of other (non-interest) tax shields to high geared companies is consistent with the 
argument that these can be substitutes for interest in seeking to minimise tax liabilities (DeAngelo and 
Masulis, 1980). 
 
Two significant differences were observed in Table 7 (Panel B, column 2). High geared companies 
were more ready to accept the view that a company would issue debt when equity is undervalued by 
the market; this might be ex post justification that the respondents’ own company’s high debt level is 
a rational consequence of information asymmetry. Low geared companies more strongly rejected the 
view that a company issues debt when recent profits are not sufficient to fund activities. 
 
Industry effects 
 
Cross-tabulations indicate that the likelihood of companies adopting a target capital structure, or of 
following a hierarchy of financial sources, is not associated with industry classification. Thus, there is 
little evidence here that companies within particular stock exchange sectors adopt similar financing 
strategies. By contrast, the likelihood of maintaining financial slack does seem to differ across sectors 
(χ2 = 12.93; p = 0.044). Further partitioning analysis shows that fewer companies in the non-cyclical 
consumer goods sector (39%) maintain slack, but more companies in the cyclical consumer goods 
(80%) and information technology (78%) sectors do so.15 The differences are consistent with the 
expected greater cash flow variability and operating risk in the latter two sectors. 
 
Industry variation in opinions on firm-specific financing decisions is indicated in Panel B, column 3, 
of Table 6, with two significant differences observed. First, industry variation in the maintenance of 
slack (previous paragraph) is mirrored by reduced concern about projected cash flows/earnings in 
information technology and cyclical consumer goods, and greater concern in non-cyclical consumer 
goods. Utilities and resource sectors also have significantly greater concern about cash flows. A 
possible explanation might be that the different concerns about cash flows reflect current gearing 
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levels. However, while there are (non-significant) differences in industry-average gearing levels, these 
do not appear to correlate with concerns about cash flows. Second, opinions on whether ‘preventing 
the company from becoming a take-over target’ influences a firm’s debt level are cross-sectorally 
quite diverse. At one extreme, resources and information technology sectors argue that this is of little 
importance but, at the other, non-cyclical services (i.e. food and drug retailers) consider it to be 
moderately important. This may reflect industry-specific differences in take-over fears. 
 
Just one significant industry-sensitive response was observed in Table 7 (Panel B, column 3). 
Respondents’ views on the relationship between R&D dependence and gearing (row 5) were 
somewhat diverse (high standard deviation), with utilities disagreeing but resources companies 
agreeing quite strongly that gearing would be lower for R&D dependent firms. 
 
5. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 
While respondents’ views on specific features of corporate financing decisions have intrinsic interest, 
the relationship between their views from practice and extant theories is of particular importance. 
Table 8 seeks to summarise the evidence from the questionnaire in relation to each of the theories and 
elements of theories. 
 
< TABLE 8 about here > 
 
Certain elements appear to have strong support and are generally consistent with results from UK 
regression studies (references in brackets): the tax advantage of debt interest (Walsh and Ryan, 1997); 
the need for collateral in debt contracts constraining the use of debt (asset tangibility influence: 
Bennett and Donnelly, 1993; Adedeji, 1998; Bevan and Danbolt, 2004); consideration of the market 
response to debt or equity issues (Marsh, 1984); and companies issuing debt when they feel that 
equity is undervalued. Respondents’ concern about long-term company survivability is difficult to 
reconcile with UK regression results which report a positive relationship between debt and earnings 
variability (Bennett and Donnelly, 1993). 
 
On the other hand, certain arguments are strongly refuted. Perhaps surprisingly, respondents do not 
agree that interest tax shields are formally balanced with bankruptcy costs, one of the fundamental 
features of the trade-off theory. There are, however, potential behavioural explanations for the other 
four refutations. For example, respondents do not consider the personal tax circumstances of debt 
providers but, given the difficulty of doing so, this is perhaps not surprising. Similarly, they do not 
accept the agency theory argument (a supposed benefit) that using debt commits a large proportion of 
cash flow to interest payments thereby acting as a control on management’s potential excesses. Again, 
this may not be surprising since it requires an admission by managers’ that their and other 
stakeholders’ objectives are sometimes in conflict. Respondents do not agree that shares are issued to 
dilute certain shareholders’ interests, perhaps because this may denote self-interested (unethical?) 
political manoeuvring against some shareholders, or simply because managers have not been in a 
position where it was necessary to contemplate such an action. Finally, as suggested earlier, it is not 
surprising that managers do not believe that issuing shares sends unfavourable signals to the market. 
 
There is evidence that many of the theoretical arguments are accepted by a significant number of 
respondents: the importance of interest tax shield (consistent with Walsh and Ryan, 1997), financial 
distress, agency costs (consistent with Walsh and Ryan, 1997 and, for large companies, Lasfer, 1998) 
also, at least implicitly, information asymmetry. The use of debt as an instrument in corporate control 
situations is not generally accepted. 
 
Consistent with the trade-off theory, half of the respondents consider that their firms adopt a target 
capital structure. But 60% claim to follow a hierarchy of sources of finance, and these firms tend to 
rank the attractiveness of sources as expected in the pecking order theory. While 59% of firms 
maintain financial slack, this flexibility is valued by firms generally rather than just by ‘hierarchy’ 
firms. The two ‘competing’ capital structure theories are not accepted as mutually-exclusive (or 
exhaustive) by all respondents, since some firms adopt (at least partially) both strategies, while a 
significant number of firms do not appear to follow either of these strategies. Such observations raise 
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concerns about the usefulness of large-scale regression modelling of capital structure determinants. In 
normal usage, these models can only describe whether a particular theory is consistent with the 
observed capital structure of the ‘average firm’ in the population. They are not typically used to model 
the diversity of capital structure practice.  
 
As with most UK regression-based determinant studies (Bennett and Donnelly, 1993; Lasfer, 1995; 
Bevan and Danbolt, 1998; Ozkan, 2001; Bevan and Danbolt; 2004), there is clear evidence that 
company size affects corporate financing decisions. For example, large companies are more likely to 
adopt a target debt level and to maintain financial slack (though not more likely to follow a hierarchy 
of finance). Similarly, current high levels of gearing encourage a greater focus on particular issues 
such as projected cash flows, loan covenants and non-interest tax shields. This contingency on debt 
levels suggests that empirical studies of capital structure dynamics may be particularly fruitful (see, 
for example, Hovakimian et al. (2001) and references therein; and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
for an illustration of the difficulties involved). In contrast with some UK regression studies (Bennett 
and Donnelly, 1993; Adedeji, 1998), there is little evidence here that firms in specific industries adopt 
similar financing strategies; however, the importance of financial flexibility in terms of maintenance 
of financial slack does appear to be industry-related. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Overall, the results suggest that current theories of capital structure all contribute to decision-making 
practice though certain aspects of the theories are strongly refuted. Importantly, finance directors’ 
opinions are not fully consistent with either of the main theories. There are several possible reasons 
for this. Clearly, the capital structure decision is a complex, multi-dimensional problem. Humans have 
bounded rationality (Simon, 1957), so it would be surprising if all factors were considered. In 
addition, some responses may reflect organisational inertia, which makes organisations slow to adapt 
to changes in the relevant environment (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Moreover, financing decisions 
are likely to be the product of complex group processes. Capital structure theory is not (yet) able to 
capture these complexities. Although dynamic regression models are beginning to recognise that 
relationships might vary over time, models that incorporate elements of both trade-off theory and 
pecking order theory might be a fruitful line of enquiry. 
 
The study also suggests that attention should be given to seeking a better understanding of the 
diversity and complexity of firms’ capital structure decisions rather than simply describing the 
associations between capital structure outcomes and firm-specific characteristics for the ‘average 
firm’. In view of our finding that managers do not believe the market to be efficient, future research 
might also usefully consider alternative decision models which are less founded on rational 
economics. In-depth case study observations of individual firms’ financing decisions, and particularly 
of changes over time would be especially valuable in exploring this diversity and related behavioural 
effects.  
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ENDNOTES 
                                                     
 
1 Tufano’s (2001) definition of clinical research, ‘empirical work that examines a relatively small number of 
events intensively’, encompassed case study research, small-scale research such as industry-level studies and 
surveys. He suggested that large-sample empirical evidence, while seeking to reject theories, often ends up 
simply confirming them, which is a much weaker form of research.  
 
2 It is feasible to specifically model the possibility of different financing approaches being adopted by firms. For 
example, Dissanaike et al. (2001) found evidence that one financing approach is not likely to be descriptive for 
all UK firms. 
 
3 Since completing the present study two further working papers making international comparisons of corporate 
finance practice based on a survey have become available. The first (Bancel and Mittoo, 2002) provided a 
preliminary analysis based on just 61 respondents spanning 17 European countries, including 7 from the UK. 
The second (Brounen et al., 2004) replicated and extended the Graham and Harvey (2001) study internationally 
with 313 respondents, including 65 from the UK. 
  
4 Large sample studies offer statistical power and cross-sectional variation but often have weaknesses related to 
variable specification and the inability to ask qualitative questions. Intensive case studies (less commonly used 
in finance research) offer excellent detail and allow the exploration of unique aspects of corporate behaviour, 
but necessarily involve small samples and usually give sample-specific, non-generalisable, results. The survey 
approach offers a balance between these two extremes. Moderately large samples provide statistical power and a 
broad cross-section of sample firms; at the same time, very specific and qualitative questions about behaviour 
and contextual factors can be asked. Of course, survey analysis is not without its own potential problems. These 
include the risk that respondents are not representative of the population of firms, and that the survey questions 
may be misinterpreted or misunderstood. 
 
5 Questions on the responding company’s leasing policy were addressed in Section C (five pages) and are 
reported in a separate paper (Beattie et al., 2003). 
 
6 The three size sub-samples (n = 66), based on total assets, were: large > £140m ≥ medium ≥ £27.7m > small. 
The three gearing sub-samples, based on total debt/equity MV, were: 619% ≥ high ≥ 37% > medium > 8% > 
small ≥ 0%. 
 
7 At the time when the questionnaire was issued (during the financial year ending 31 March 2001), the standard 
UK corporation tax rate of 30% applied to companies with taxable profits above £1.5 million. This tapered 
down to 20% for profits between £50-300,000 and down to 10% for profits below £10,000. 
 
8 Including 225 negative responses, the overall response rate was 50%. The major reasons given for negative 
response were lack of time/staff availability/too busy (40%), and company/individual policy not to respond to 
questionnaires (24%).  
 
9 A questionnaire investigating ‘lease accounting reform’ was sent out over a similar time period to the 
remaining one-third of the UKQI population. Respondents to this survey were invited to request the ‘leasing and 
corporate financing decisions’ questionnaire and six requested and completed the questionnaire. 
 
10 The 198 companies of the responding finance directors ranged in size (total assets) from £17,288 million 
down to £701,000 with a mean and median of £872 million and £71 million, respectively. The population mean 
and median were £637m and £52m, respectively.  
 
11 These tests suffer from a number of well-known limitations; see Wallace and Mellor (1988) and Wallace and 
Cooke (1990) for discussions. 
 
12 More specifically, the number of respondents who felt that their company’s ordinary shares are fairly priced 
0% of the time (i.e. never) was 26; 1-25% of the time was 63; 26-75% of the time was 73; 76-99% of the time 
was 24; and 100% of the time (i.e. always) was 2. 
 
13 Not surprisingly, there was a strong degree of association (χ2 = 36.2; p < 0.001) between companies that 
‘believe there is a maximum debt level that should not be surpassed’ and companies that measure gearing. Of 
the 47 companies that said they did not measure gearing, 13 had zero total debt. 
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14 Percentages sum to more than 100% as 16 respondents ticked more than one option. 
 
15 It was necessary to combine the three sectors with small representation in the sample for the formal chi-
squared test and the combined grouping was close to the overall average for maintenance of slack. 
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 Table 1: Findings of prior survey research on capital structure determinants
Author(s) Year Respondents
Response  
rate  Conclusions drawn by author(s)
US Setting
Donaldson 1961 25 large US na Hierarchy of financing sources
corporations Supports pecking order theory
Scott & 1982 CFO's of 21.2% Firms have target leverage ratios and accept the notion of optimal
Johnson 212 of Fortune capital structure
1000 firms Supports trade-off theory
Pinegar & 1989 CFO's of 35.2% Evidence supports the use of a financing hierarcy
Wilbricht 176 of Fortune Supports pecking order theory
500 firms
Norton 1989 CFO's of 21% Some evidence of target ratios, hierarchy of sources. No evidence of
98 of Fortune a trade-off or asymmetric information or agency costs.
500 firms Mixed evidence
Graham & 2001 CFO's of 8.5% Target debt ratio to maintain financial flexibility. Moderate importance of
Harvey 392 of Fortune tax implications, less emphasis on financial distress. Interest cost of
500 firms and debt of moderate importance.
4400 FEI Supports trade-off theory
members Moderate evidence that debt issued when recent profits insufficient and
(4587 population) equity issues affected by market valuation.
No significant consideration of agency costs/benefits, corporate control
Supports pecking order theory
Settings other than US
Fawthrop 1975 54 major UK na Use of debt ratios to constrain debt limits. Importance of maintaining
& Terry corporations financial flexibility. 
Stonehill 1975 Firms in US, na No debt ratio maintained, take advantage of favourable opportunities to
et al. Japan, France, issue debt or equity. 
Norway, Holland Conflicting both pecking order  and trade-off theories
Allen 1991 48 listed na Some evidence on target debt ratios and tax implications of debt. Most
Australian concern with maintaining spare debt capacity. Internal funds marginally
corporations favoured. Supports pecking order theory
Allen 1999 132 Australian 24% UK and Australian firms maintain spare debt capacity to be in a position
67 Large UK 13% to seize opportunities or make acquisitions. Supports pecking order theory
53 Japanese 10% Not so in Japanese firms.
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Table 2: Companies that adopt a target capital structure and influences on  the target level
Question asked 
Panel A
To what extent does your company seek to maintain a target capital structure by using approximately 
constant proportions of debt and equity finance (even if the policy is one of zero debt finance)?
Company size (No of companies)
Target Large Medium Small Total
No target 22 35 38 95 (49%)
Target 43 30 28 101 (51%)
65 65 66 196 (100%)
Panel B
For companies with a target capital structure:
What is your company's target amount of debt?
[expressed as a proportion of total (i.e. debt plus equity) finance]
Target debt range No of cos % of cos
0% 6 7
1 - 25% 19 22
26 -50% 43 51
51 -75% 11 13
76-100% 3 4
> 100% 3 4
85 100
Mean (Median) 45% (40%)
Minimum (Maximum) 0% (300%)
Panel C
Who/what is influential in setting target capital structure ratios?
Rank the following in order of importance (1 being most important, 9 being least important)
Mean standard Grouping2
rank1 deviation
1 Company senior management 1.65 1.54 1
2 Existing shareholders 4.10 2.23   2
3 Commercial bankers 4.77 2.45   2  3
4 Investment bankers 5.06 2.61       3  4
5 Debt covenants 5.29 2.67       3  4
6 Outside investment analysts 5.70 2.41           4
7 Potential shareholders 5.72 2.20           4
8 Comparison with ratios of industry competitors 6.37 2.23             5
9 Major trade creditors 7.86 1.72               6
Notes
1. Table is ordered by mean rank
2. Grouping based on statistical difference between rankings at 5% (2-tail), using 
    Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
(n = 83)
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Table 3: Ranking of long-term finance by companies that follow a hierarchy
 of finance sources
Source of long-term finance Mean standard Grouping3
rank1,2 deviation
1 Internal reserves 1.67 1.08 1
2 Straight debt 2.64 1.29   2
3 Finance leases 4.31 1.94     3
4 Operating leases 4.47 1.98     3
5 Ordinary shares 4.57 2.21     3
6 Convertible debt 5.98 1.78       4
7 Straight preferred shares 7.02 1.02         5
8 Convertible preferred shares 7.62 0.74           6
Notes
1. Respondents ranked the eight sources from 1 (most favoured) to 8 (lease favoured)
2. Table is ordered by mean rank
3. Grouping based on statistical difference between rankings at 5% (2-tail), using 
    Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
(n = 112)
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Table 4: Cross-tabulation of number of companies adopting a target capital 
structure and those following a hierarchy
Hierarchy Yes No Total
Yes 61 (32%) 52 (28%) 113 (60%)
No 34 (18%) 42 (22%) 76 (40%)
95 (50%) 94 (50%) 189 (100%)
Note
The null hypothesis of independence between 'target' and 'hierarchy' 
cannot be rejected (χ2 = 1.55; p = 0.213)
Target
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Table 5: Spare borrowing capacity
Panel A: Policy Yes No
Does your company have a policy for maintaining spare borrowing 
capacity? (n=193) 59% 41%
Panel B: Amount
% of existing total long-term borrowing maintained as spare No of cos % of cos
1 - 25% 41 64%
26 -50% 17 27%
51 -75% 2 3%
76-100% 4 6%
64 100%
Mean (Median) 29% (20%)
Minimum (Maximum) 0% (100%)
Panel C: Source
For companies who maintain spare borrowing capacity (n=114)
Nature and source of spare borrowing capacity     %1
Overdraft facility 73
Unsecured loans 32
Leasing/hire purchase 21
Secured loans 20
Mortgage lending 4
Debentures 2
Other 12
Note
1. Percentages exceed 100% as respondents were asked to tick all applicable options
    Nature and source are shown in descending order of frequency
Panel D: Reasons
For companies who maintain spare borrowing capacity (n=114)
Reasons for spare borrowing capacity     %1
Unplanned opportunities 68
For acquisitions 54
Reserve for crisis 44
For special projects 31
Other 8
Notes
1. Percentages exceed 100% as respondents were asked to tick all applicable options
2. Reasons are shown in descending order of frequency
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Table 6: The relative importance of factors in choosing the appropriate amount of total debt
Panel A Panel B
Tests
Question asked Mean1 stan dev Grouping2 Size3 Debt4 Industry5
Please indicate the relative importance  of the following factors in choosing
the appropriate amount of total debt (even if zero) for your company.
1 Ensuring the long term survivability of the company 4.41 0.88 1 ns ns ns
2 Projected cash flow or earnings from assets financed 4.21 0.84   2 ns H>L (1%) 5%
3 Volatility of the company's earnings and cash flows 3.72 1.02     3 ns ns ns
4 Ensuring customers /suppliers are not worried about the company's survival 3.62 1.04     3  4 ns ns ns
5 Restrictive covenants imposed by debt providers 3.58 1.10     3  4 ns H>L (5%) ns
6 Level of interest rates 3.52 0.91         4  5 ns ns ns
7 Tax advantage of interest deductions to the company 3.34 1.18             5  6 L>S (1%) ns ns
8 Avoiding the need to issue equity (which would dilute existing shareholders' 
claims/voting proportions)
3.25 1.09                 6  7 L>S (1%) ns ns
9 Potential costs of bankruptcy, near-bankruptcy or financial distress 2.95 1.58                     7  8 ns ns ns
10 Level of other non-taxable deductions (e.g. capital allowances) available to 
the company
2.93 1.02                         8 ns H>L (1%) ns
11 Preventing the company from becoming a take-over target 2.54 1.17                           9 L>S (5%) ns 10%
12 Ensuring that a large proportion of cash flow is committed to interest 
payments to provide a disciplinary control on management
2.46 1.03                           9 ns ns ns
13 Personal tax cost your investors face when they receive interest income 2.02 0.93                             10 ns ns ns
Notes
1. Response categories are: 1=not important at all; 2=of little importance; 3=fairly important; 4=important; 5=very important; table is ordered by mean response
2. Grouping based on statistical difference between rankings at 5% (2-tail), using Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
3. Significance level of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 2-tail test for mean response difference between large (L) and small (S) companies;
    Large/small companies represent top/bottom third of companies based on total assets. Mean(large) > mean(small) in all cases
4. Significance level of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 2-tail test for mean response difference between high (H) and low (L) geared companies
    High/low geared represent top/bottom third of companies based on gearing measured as 'total debt/MV equity'. Mean(high geared) > mean(low geared) in all cases
5. Significance level of Kruskal-Wallis test for mean response difference between industry groups
    For row 2, Fisher's LSD tests suggest that responses from information technology (mean = 3.53) and cyclical consumer goods (mean = 3.73) are sigificantly low
    and from utilities (mean = 4.60), non-cyclical services (mean = 4.50) and resources (mean = 4.45) are significantly high.
    For row 11, Fisher's LSD tests suggest that responses from resources (mean = 1.91) and information technology (mean = 1.93) are sigificantly low
    and from non-cyclical services (mean = 3.33) are significantly high.  
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Table 7: Views on general statements regarding capital structure determinants
Panel A Panel B
Tests
Question asked Mean1,2 stan dev Size3 Debt4 Industry5
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following general statements in the context of UK listed companies’ financing decisions.
1 In making debt and equity decisions, a company considers the market response to new issues. 4.20*** 0.73 ns ns ns
2 Use of debt would decrease relative to equity if bond interest were no longer tax deductible. 3.79*** 0.98 ns ns ns
3 A company would issue debt when equity is undervalued by the market. 3.70*** 0.97 ns H>L (5%) ns
4 If a company could issue unsecured long term debt at the same after-issue, after-tax cost of secured debt, it 
would increase its use of debt financing.
3.66*** 0.91 ns ns ns
5 If a company were more dependent on R&D for its success, its debt to equity ratio would be lower. 3.33*** 1.13 ns ns 5%
6 Private placements offer a satisfactory exchange of information between a company and investors without 
publicising proprietary information in full.
3.30*** 0.94 ns ns ns
7 A decision to issue long term debt sends a favourable signal to the market about future long term prospects. 3.10 0.86 ns ns ns
8 Restrictive covenants might be suggested in the hopes of convincing a doubtful  lender to grant a loan. 2.99 1.05 ns ns ns
9 A company issues shares when prices are high, even though present needs are not great, in order to build up a 
long term fund cushion.
2.89 1.02 ns ns ns
10 Issuing debt is delayed because of transaction costs and fees, and retiring debt is delayed because of 
recapitalisation costs and fees.
2.89 0.87 ns ns ns
11 The decision to issue debt or equity is affected by the existence of tax loss carry forwards. 2.86** 0.96 ns ns ns
12 If bankruptcy occurred, finance directors would, in general, find comparable positions elsewhere. 2.58*** 1.06 ns ns ns
13 A company issues debt when recent profits are not sufficient to fund activities. 2.56*** 1.04 ns H>L (5%) ns
14 Share price usually declines when debt is issued. 2.40*** 0.95 S>L (5%) ns ns
15 The present value of interest tax shields is balanced with the present value of possible bankruptcy costs. 2.26*** 0.83 ns ns ns
16 A company would issue shares to dilute the holdings of certain shareholders. 2.18*** 1.05 ns ns ns
17 A decision to issue shares sends an unfavourable signal to the market about future long-term prospects. 2.07*** 0.90 ns ns ns
Notes
1. Response categories are: 1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=neutral; 4=agree; 5=strongly agree. Table is ordered by mean response
2. Significance of t-test of whether mean response is significantly different from 3 = neutral; *** and ** = significant at 1% and 5% levels, respectively (2-tail test) 
3. Significance level of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 2-tail test for mean response difference between large (L) and small (S) companies;
    Large/small companies represent top/bottom third of companies based on total assets. Mean(large) = 2.24; mean(small) = 2.61 for the one difference (row 14)
4. Significance level of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 2-tail test for mean response difference between high (H) and low (L) geared companies
    High/low geared represent top/bottom third of companies based on gearing measured as 'total debt/MV equity'. 
    Mean(high geared) = 3.81; mean(low geared) = 3.44 for row 3; mean(high geared) = 2.77; mean(low geared) = 2.31 for row 13
5. Significance level of Kruskal-Wallis test for mean response difference between industry groups
    For row 5, Fisher's LSD tests suggest that responses from utilities (mean = 2.33) are sigificantly low and from resources (mean = 4.30) are significantly high.
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Table 8: Summary of evidence on capital structure theory from present survey
EVIDENCE
Theory and theory elements Table(row) or
text section Strong Weak Weak Strong
Traditional trade-off theory [1]
Direct evidence
Trade-off between interest tax shield and distress costs 7 (15) X
Target capital structure: strict/flexible 2 (panel A) X
Reluctance to deviate from existing capital structure text S4(iv) X
Interest tax shield [1A]
Interest rates 6 (6) X
Tax advantage of interest deductions 6 (7) X
Personal tax cost facing lenders 6 (13) X
Non-interest tax shields 6 (10) O
Tax advantage of interest deductions 7 (2) X
Debt/equity issue is affected by existence of tax loss carry forwards 7 (11) X
Financial distress [1B]
Potential costs of financial distress 6 (9) O
Ensuring long-term survivability 6 (1) X
Ensuring customers/suppliers not worried about co survival 6 (4) X
Volatility of earnings/cash flow 6 (3) X
High level of R&D (increasing likelihood of financial distress) 7 (5) X
Extended trade-off theory [2]
Agency costs [2A]
Restrictive covenants imposed by debt providers 6 (5) X
Collateral constraints on debt 7 (4) X
High level of R&D (low level of tangible assets) 7 (5) X
Agency benefits [2B]
Interest as large part of cash flow to control management 6 (12) X
Restrictive covenants suggested to doubtful lenders 7 (8) O
Finance directors aware of personal costs of bankruptcy 7 (12) X
Pecking order theory [3]
Direct evidence
No target debt ratio 2 (panel A) X
Willingness to deviate from existing capital structure text S4(iv) X
Following a hierarchy of financial sources text S4(iv) X
Internal resources most favoured 3 X
Issuing debt when recent profits insufficient to fund activities 7 (13) X
Debt favoured over equity 3 X
Use of debt avoids need to issue equity 6 (8) O
Volatility of earnings/cash flows 6 (3) X
Maintenance of financial slack 5 (panel A) X
Underlying assumption of asymmetric information
Consideration of market response to debt/equity issues 7 (1) X
Private placements to avoid revealing proprietary info 7 (6) X
Decision to issue debt sends favourable signals 7 (7) O
Decision to issue shares sends unfavourable signals 7 (17) X
Belief that share price declines when debt is issued 7 (14) X
Issue debt when equity is undervalued 7 (3) X
Issue shares when prices high to build up fund cushion 7 (9) O
Corporate control [4]
Debt prevents co from becoming a takeover target 6 (11) X
Issue share to dilute certain equity holdings 7 (16) X
Against theory Supports theoryNeutral
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